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Abstract 
This paper adds to the literature on the voluntary provision of public goods by showing that the 
warm glow that individuals gain depends on the perceived relative effectiveness of contributions.  
We use a new survey on pro-environment behaviors, attitudes, and knowledge and find that 
individuals act in accordance with their beliefs, regardless of whether or not these beliefs are 
accurate, and engage more frequently in activities that have a higher perceived impact on 
environmental quality.  We find that low provision of the public good is greater among people 
who believe they cannot do much for the environment and do not consider themselves 
environmentalists. 
 
1 Introduction 
The literature on the voluntary provision of public goods shows that contributions are 
larger than would be expected if individuals were purely self-interested.  In Andreoni’s theory of 
impure altruism, contributing creates a warm glow.  According to this theory, it is the act of 
giving that generates utility (Andreoni, 1989, 1990). Duncan (2004) proposes an alternative 
motivation, “impact philanthropy,” where the increase in the public good caused by the 
individual’s efforts creates utility, while Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg (2003) develop a model 
in which individuals gain utility when they act in accordance with their self-image as socially-
responsible people.  Our paper extends this literature by developing a model in which the 
perceived effectiveness of effort generates utility but individuals might have inaccurate and 
differing information about the impact of specific efforts.  We then present evidence from a new 
nationally representative household survey that supports the key assumptions and conclusions of 
the model.  In particular, in the case of the public good of environmental quality, we show that 
most individuals hold incorrect beliefs about the impact of their pro-environment efforts, but 
efforts correlate consistently with perceived impacts.  These results suggest that it is necessary to 
consider the lack of accurate information in explaining individual contributions to public goods. 
Examining the relationship between the perceived impact of contributions and actual 
contributions has important implications for public policy.  First, although it is tempting to 
conclude that more education about the value of individual efforts to increase the public good 
would result in greater provision, our model and empirical results imply that the effect of more 
education is ambiguous.  As individuals develop a better understanding of the effectiveness of 
various activities, the quantity of the public good that they voluntarily provide could either 
increase or decrease, depending in part on whether they initially underestimate or overestimate 
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the relative impact of their efforts.  In what follows, we discuss the circumstances under which 
education may lead to a more efficient allocation of contributions and the conditions under which 
education may actually lead to less of the public good.  A second policy conclusion, independent 
of whether individuals are fully informed or not, is that government regulation would not be a 
perfect substitute for voluntary pro-environment actions.  This result parallels the conclusion in 
Andreoni (1989).    
While our model can be applied to different public goods, we examine empirically one of 
today’s foremost public policy challenges: reduction of greenhouse gases or, more generally, 
resource conservation.  A great amount of information and advocacy efforts are being dedicated 
to these issues but it is unclear whether these campaigns are successful and whether individuals 
are willing to make sustainable consumption choices voluntarily.1 We use data from a new 
representative national survey and estimate the relationship between the perceived impacts of 
several activities on emissions of carbon dioxide and actual frequency of pro-environment 
behaviors.  We find that, on average, individuals overestimate the effectiveness of their efforts 
on emissions of carbon dioxide but people act according to their perceptions and engage more 
frequently in activities that have higher perceived impacts. Thus, we present evidence for a 
modified warm glow, a warm glow based on the perceived impact of contributions rather than 
the contribution itself. 
This paper relates to several research areas.  First, it adds to the literature analyzing the 
role that information plays in public goods contributions.  Kremer and Miguel (2007) investigate 
the determinants of individual actions to prevent the spread of infectious disease in Kenya and 
find that school health education programs had no effect on individual behavior.  Using 
                                                     
1 A popular example is the public campaign associated with the film An Inconvenient Truth.  In fact, we use 
information on this film’s web site, www.climatecrisis.com as the basis for some of the examples we provide in our 
survey. 
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experimental data, Andreoni (1995) examines whether public goods contributions can be 
attributed to “kindness or confusion” and finds evidence for both.  Houser and Kurzban (2002) 
present corroborating evidence.  In these papers, the confusion is specific to the experimental 
design.  In our empirical work, we find that individuals hold inaccurate beliefs about the impact 
of activities in which they regularly engage, but the level of their contributions is still consistent 
with those beliefs.   
  This paper also adds to the literature on the motives for altruism.  As mentioned earlier, 
Duncan (2004) develops a model in which individuals gain utility from the increase in the public 
good caused by their efforts.  Our model takes into account Duncan’s impact philanthropy yet 
also includes Andreoni’s original warm glow motive because individuals gain utility from the 
perceived impact of the effort, not from the actual consumption of the public good.2  More 
importantly, we allow for individuals to have inaccurate information about the effectiveness of 
their contributions, an extension that has both empirical and policy relevance.  
Also related to our work is the research by Brekke, Kverndokk, and Nyborg (2003) 
examining whether a desire to be socially responsible motivates recycling efforts and community 
work.  As we do, they consider the effectiveness of efforts in their model.  However, they focus 
on how effort relates to self-image and do not consider the possibility that individuals may have 
different levels of accuracy of information.3  An important implication of Brekke, Kverndokk, 
and Nyborg (2003) is that public policy might decrease the private provision of the public good 
if mandated behavior makes it more difficult for individuals to fulfill their ideal actions.4  Our 
                                                     
2 In other words, in our model, individuals gain utility from the efforts even when they believe that their action has 
no appreciable effect on the total quantity of the public good. 
3 In their model, allowing individuals to have different perceptions about the effectiveness of effort would pose 
additional complications unnecessary for their main point.  In particular, it would then be necessary to propose a 
mechanism through which individuals would define and learn the amount of effort a socially responsible person 
ought to exert. 
4 See also Bruvoll and Nyborg (2004) and Nyborg and Rege (2003).  
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research also suggests public policy might have unexpected consequences, although in our case 
this conclusion is due in part to the possibility that information about the impacts of different 
pro-environment behaviors could make individuals revise downwards the perceived 
effectiveness of their actions and provide less of the public good.  
Finally, our work relates to the literature examining values and sustainable consumption.5  
This area of research usually focuses on the categorization of values (for example, universalism 
versus individualism) and their influence on attitudes, intentions, and behaviors.  Although we do 
control for values in our analysis, our main hypotheses relate to the effects of perceived 
effectiveness of efforts on the type and intensity of such efforts.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  We present the theoretical framework in Section 2.  
Section 3 presents the empirical methods and main hypotheses.  Section 4 describes the survey 
design and the original data set used for our empirical analysis.  Section 5 discusses the main 
results and robustness checks and section 6 concludes.  
2 Theoretical Framework    
2.1  Utility Maximization 
 We model individuals who can contribute to a public good through J distinct activities.  
The utility of individual i is equal to: 
    ))(),...(,,( 11 iJJiii egegGxuU =         (1) 
where xi  represents consumption of the private good, G represents the total amount of the public 
good, eij represents the effort that individual i makes in performing activity j, (j=1 to J), and 
gj(eij)  represents individual i’s contribution to the public good through activity j.  We assume 
utility is increasing and concave in all arguments, so that 0)(,0)( <⋅′′>⋅′ uu .  Time is spent either 
                                                     
5 The literature examining values and sustainable consumption is large. See, among many others, Thogersen and 
Olander (2002), and Dietz, Gergory, and Guagnana (1998).   
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producing the private good or supplying efforts eij to a particular activity.  We assume that an 
individual’s contributions to the public good through activity j increases with efforts at a 
decreasing rate and allow for gj(eij) to vary across individuals with  
0)('',0)(',0)0( <⋅>⋅= jjj ggg  for all  j.6  Time spent in the private sector is directly converted 
into the private good so that individuals face the following time constraint: 
    Tex
j
iji =+∑      (2) 
 The total amount of the public good is a linear function of the impact of the individual 
efforts:     
∑∑==
i j
ijj egbegGG )())((      (3) 
where b>0 is a constant.
 
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into equation (1) gives: 
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First, we solve for the social optimum, taking into account the warm glow motive of 
individuals.  The social optimum is achieved by maximizing   
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6 This assumption of decreasing returns is reasonable if individuals first undertake activities that are the easiest in 
contributing to the public good.  Abatement might increase with effort at an increasing rate if there were learning-
by-doing.  
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For each individual, there are J first order conditions that correspond to the J possible 
activities that contribute to the public good.  Each FOC states that the marginal utility of the 
private good is set equal to the sum of two terms.  The first term is the marginal product of effort 
expended through activity j times the marginal product of the individual’s contribution in 
increasing the public good times the sum of the individual marginal utilities of the public good.  
The second term is the marginal product of effort times the marginal utility of the individual’s 
contribution to the public good.  This second term represents the modified warm glow effect, a 
warm glow that depends on the impact of effort and not exclusively on the amount of effort. 
2.2  Voluntary Provision 
 Now we derive the conditions for voluntary provision of the public good.  Individual i 
chooses effort levels ei1, …eiJ to maximize equation (4).  The first order conditions are: 
   ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂+∂
∂
∂
∂=∂
∂
j
ii
ij
j
i
i
g
U
G
Ub
e
g
x
U     ji,∀     (7) 
 Notice the difference between the FOC’s in equation (6) and the FOC’s in equation (7).  
To achieve the social optimum, the first term on the right hand side in equation (6) includes the 
sum of each individual’s marginal utility of the public good.  Private provision of the public 
good will yield FOC’s where the first term on the right hand side includes only that individual’s 
marginal utility of the public good.  Thus, we obtain the standard result that too little of the 
public good is produced relative to the social optimum.   
2.3  Perceptions and Behavior 
In our empirical models we examine how perceptions about the effectiveness of specific 
activities that reduce emissions of carbon dioxide correlate with the frequency with which 
individuals undertake pro-environment behaviors.  Thus, we can interpret )(⋅jg  as the technology 
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that transforms effort into carbon abatement and )(⋅G  as the technology for transforming carbon 
reductions into environmental quality.   
Although there is an actual technology )(⋅jg  for each activity j, individuals might not 
accurately assess the effectiveness of their efforts.  As we describe in the next section, we find 
that in a nationally representative sample, individuals differ in their beliefs about how several 
activities reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and that typical respondents misperceive the impact 
of their efforts.  It is also the case that individuals hold different beliefs about technology that 
creates the public good (in our model this is Equation 3).  For example, in our sample, only 22 
percent of the respondents say it is definitely true that using coal, oil, or gasoline contributes to 
climate change.   
Let (.)ˆ ijg be the belief of individual i about the effectiveness of activity j in reducing 
carbon emissions and let ibˆ  be the belief of individual i about the technology that transforms 
carbon reduction into environmental quality.  Misperceptions can occur when bbi ≠ˆ  and 
)()(ˆ ⋅≠⋅ jij gg .  An individual without perfect information chooses the optimal level of efforts 
given )(ˆ ⋅ijg rather than the actual technology.  Thus, the first order condition is: 
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An examination of Equation 8 reveals that without making further restrictive 
assumptions, the effect of more accurate information is ambiguous.  The reason for this is that 
changes in the perceived effectiveness of efforts have both an output effect and a substitution 
effect.  For example, as individuals who initially underestimate the impact of their efforts 
become better informed, the output effect decreases the optimal level of effort because 
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individuals are able to contribute more to the public good with less effort.   On the other hand, 
the substitution effect increases effort because individuals allocate more time to activities with 
relatively higher impacts. If the output effect dominates, then when individuals learn that activity 
j has a higher impact than originally perceived, they will decrease the time they spend in that 
activity.  If the substitution effect dominates, however, individuals will put more effort into that 
activity. The analogous conclusions hold when individuals overestimate the impact of their 
efforts—they may increase or decrease their efforts when they learn the truth. 
Because we do not have theoretical grounds on which to impose assumptions to 
determine unambiguously the optimal response on efforts, how individuals respond to perceived 
impact of their actions becomes an empirical question which we take up in the remainder of the 
paper.  The next section describes our empirical approach for providing evidence on this issue.  
In particular, we empirically estimate the effect of beliefs about impact of efforts on the amount 
and type of effort that individuals exert.  Section 4 presents the data and provides more specifics 
on the variables used in the analysis.  Section 5 provides results that indicate individuals are in 
fact more likely to engage in pro-environment behaviors the higher the perceived effects of 
specific activities on carbon emissions.   
3  Methods and Hypotheses 
 To gather evidence on the role that perceived impacts have on pro-environment 
behaviors, we examine the factors affecting four different pro-environment behaviors.  
Specifically, our dependent variables measure the frequency over the past 12 months with which 
individuals undertake each of four behaviors out of concern for the environment: recycling, 
reducing energy consumption at home, buying environmentally friendly products, and altering 
food consumption.  We do not observe the actual amount of effort individuals dedicated to each 
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activity.  Rather, we observe responses on a 1 to 4 scale with 1 corresponding to “never,” 2 
corresponding to “occasionally,” 3 corresponding to “frequently,” and 4 corresponding to 
“nearly all the time.”  Thus, our dependent variables are ordinal.  Because these variables violate 
the assumption of the linear regression model of equal distance between categories, we present 
results from ordered probit models.7   
 For a given activity and individual, the actual level of effort y* is unobserved.  In our 
empirical model, y* depends on socio-economic characteristics, general attitudes, values, and 
knowledge, and perceived effectiveness of specific behaviors on carbon abatement. Letting the 
vector X represent these controls, the structural model for individual i is given by: 
.* iii Xy εβ +=   We observe y =1 if 1* δ<≤∞− y , y = 2 if 21 * δδ <≤ y , y = 3 if 32 * δδ <≤ y , 
and y = 4 if ∞<≤ *3 yδ , where y can be our ordinal measure of the frequency of recycling, 
energy conservation, use of environmentally friendly products, or altering food consumption.  
The δ  parameters are thresholds such that the observed response changes as the unobserved 
level of effort y* crosses the cut-off points.  For given values of the independent variables, the 
probability of outcome m (m = 1 to 4) is: ),()()|Pr( 1 βδβδ XFXFXmy mm −−−== − where we 
assume F is the normal cumulative density function with Var(ε) = 1.8  
Equation 8 provides the first order conditions to the individual’s problem and we use that 
equation to guide our empirical work.  As we describe in more detail below, we are able to proxy 
for ijiijiijij gUgGeg ˆ,ˆˆ,ˆ ∂∂∂∂∂∂ and ii GU ˆ∂∂ with responses to questions from a nationally 
representative household survey.  In the next section, we describe this survey in more detail and 
discuss how the data is used to proxy these concepts. 
                                                     
7 We also estimate ordered logit models, multinomial logit and probit models, and OLS models.  We find the results 
are robust to the estimation method. We discuss these issues in more detail in Section 5. 
8 We replicate all models assuming F is logistic. We draw the same main inferences but the standard errors under the 
assumption of normal errors are systematically smaller in our data.  
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4 Survey Design and Data  
To test the hypotheses of the model we use data for approximately 1,700 respondents 
from a new nationally representative household survey conducted in September and October of 
2007.  The respondents to the survey were part of the Knowledge Networks Internet panel who 
were recruited via random digit dialing.  Knowledge Networks uses a unique sample design for 
Internet panels, providing households Internet access to avoid the biased sample that results from 
requiring participants to obtain Internet access on their own.9,10  Volunteer panelists are not 
accepted by Knowledge Networks. 
The survey instrument contained fifty questions.11 The first set of questions asked about 
general attitudes toward the natural environment.  The second group elicited how frequently 
individuals engage in pro-environment behaviors out of concern for the environment.  Third, the 
survey evaluated the respondents’ general knowledge of environmental problems and beliefs 
about the effectiveness of specific activities on emissions of carbon dioxide.  Finally, the survey 
asked questions about time preferences, risk aversion, and attitudes towards free riding.  We 
augment the survey with respondent demographics and an array of individual characteristics that 
Knowledge Networks collects as part of their “public affairs profile,” a series of questions that 
are asked periodically of all members of the panel. 
To measure contributions to the public good of environmental protection we use four 
questions that elicit how frequently individuals engage in pro-environment behaviors out of 
                                                     
9 Internet surveys have several advantages. They allow for more complex questions than can be asked in a telephone 
survey and are less likely to be subject to interviewer bias (trying to please the interviewer by responding the “right 
way”) than telephone or face-to-face surveys are.  See Krosnick and Chang (2001) for a comparison of random digit 
dialing telephone interviews, the Knowledge Networks Internet panel, and other Internet panels. 
10 The response rate among Knowledge Networks panelists for our survey was 66%. Berrens et al. (2004) also 
present results using a survey implemented by Knowledge Networks (KN) on willingness to pay for climate change 
mitigation and Cameron and DeShazo (2001, 2004) show that their KN sample is comparable to data from the 2000 
Census. 
11 The entire survey as well as more detailed information about the survey methodology can be obtained from 
http://www.hamilton.edu/levitt/Sustainability/Environmental_survey_2008.html. 
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concern for the environment.  We focus on recycling (RECYCLE), reducing energy consumption 
at home (ENERGY), buying environmentally friendly products (PRODUCT), and altering food 
consumption (FOOD).  The survey gave some specific examples for the behaviors such as: 
washing clothes in cold water instead of hot as a way to reduce energy consumption, using 
energy-saving light bulbs as an example of buying environmentally friendly products, and eating 
less meat as a way to alter food consumption for environmental reasons.  
A main result of the model is that efforts to reduce one’s carbon footprint through various 
activities should correlate with the perceived effectiveness of the activities.  A unique aspect of 
our survey is a series of questions that assess the respondents’ beliefs about the effectiveness of 
specific behaviors on improving environmental quality.  First, the survey noted that “scientists 
think that average global temperatures are rising and global climate is changing because carbon 
dioxide from burning coal and oil and other greenhouse gases are released into the 
atmosphere.”12  Then, as a baseline comparison, the survey stated that adjusting the thermostat in 
a typical household up two degrees in the summer and down two degrees in the winter is 
associated with a 2,000 pound reduction of carbon emissions per year.  Four subsequent 
questions asked the respondent to rate the impact of different activities in terms of the amount of 
carbon reduction: recycling half of household garbage (RECYCLE_BELIEF), using cold water 
instead of hot to wash one’s clothes (COLD_BELIEF), replacing five regular light bulbs with 
compact fluorescent light bulbs (LIGHT_BELIEF), and eliminating all animal products from 
one’s diet (VEGAN_BELIEF).  Respondents were asked to make their “best guess” as to how 
much these behaviors reduced carbon emissions per year: significantly less than adjusting your 
thermostat (less than 1,500 pounds), about the same as adjusting your thermostat (1,500 up to 
                                                     
12 This information was provided after respondents answered questions eliciting general knowledge about causes of 
climate change. 
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2,500 pounds), and significantly more than adjusting your thermostat (more than 2,500 pounds).  
We code these responses in two indicator variables for each behavior (where the omitted 
category is less than 1,500 pounds).  We also create an index from these four questions by giving 
each respondent one point for each correct answer, SCORE.   
In the estimation of pro-environment behaviors, we also control for general knowledge 
about environmental problems as well as attitudes and values related to the environment, as these 
correlate with behaviors and perceptions of the effectiveness of specific activities.  The survey 
asked individuals whether or not they considered themselves to be an environmentalist.  From 
the responses to this question, we constructed two indicator variables, GREEN_SOME and 
GREEN_DEF, indicating those who responded “yes, somewhat” and “yes, definitely,” 
respectively.13  Our respondents were asked the same question approximately six months before 
they completed our survey, as part of Knowledge Networks’ public affairs profile.  We repeated 
the question to explore whether individuals might want to appear to have the “right” attitudes in 
our survey.  We find a high degree of correlation between the responses: only seven people who 
said they were definitely not an environmentalist six months earlier claim to definitely be an 
environmentalist in our survey.  This consistency across time and in different contexts adds 
confidence to our data.  
We include three variables that measure basic knowledge about climate change by using 
the extent to which people believe it is true that “Every time we use coal, oil, or gas, we 
contribute to climate change.”  Those who said this statement was definitely true are indicated by 
                                                     
13 We also experimented in our models with commonly used environmental attitudes and found those variables are 
statistically insignificant after controlling for self-reported environmentalism. Those results suggest that our measure 
of environmentalism summarizes well a person’s overall attitudes toward the environment.   
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the indicator variable, COAL_DEF, those who said it was probably true are indicated by 
COAL_PROB, and those who said it was probably not true are indicated by COAL_NOT.14   
To control for the degree to which individuals believe their actions influence overall 
environmental quality, we include the variable FATALIST that equals one if the individual 
strongly agrees or agrees that it is “difficult for somebody like me to do much about the 
environment.”  Individuals might also contribute to the public good if the level of the public 
good itself generates utility.  On a scale of one to four, PERSONAL indicates the extent to which 
people believe that climate change will affect them personally and LIVSTAND indicates the 
extent to which people believe that environmental damage will cause a reduction in living 
standards in the next 50 years.   
 We include two variables related to an individual’s overall propensity to contribute to 
public goods: a proxy for social responsibility and a proxy for optimism.  We measure social 
responsibility by summing the responses to questions about the justifiability of cheating on taxes, 
riding public transportation without paying the fare, downloading copyrighted music or movies 
without permission, and buying stolen goods.  Respondents state on a scale of one to ten where a 
ten indicates that the behavior can “never be justified” while a one indicates that the behavior is 
“always justifiable.”15  The sum of these responses becomes an index of civic responsibility, 
CIVIC, which ranges from 4 to 40.16  We also control for an individual’s overall level of 
optimism by including the response to a question that elicits, on a scale of one to four, how 
strongly individuals agree with the statement that “the U.S. economy will improve in the next 
five years.”   
                                                     
14 The survey included other general knowledge questions but this one has the strongest predictive power. 
15 These questions and scales of responses are similar to ones that appear in the World Values Survey. 
16 This treatment parallels that in Knack and Keefer (1997) who use a similar set of questions from the World 
Values Survey to measure civic responsibility at the country level.  Only about one third of our sample indicated that 
all of these behaviors are “never justifiable.”  
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Demographic controls include dichotomous variables for married respondents, 
homeowners, African-Americans, Hispanics, and two variables indicating if the individual is a 
high school or a college graduate.  We also include age and age squared, self-reported health 
status, the log of household income (at the census block level), and the fraction of the population 
in the respondent’s zip code that is classified as being in an urban area.  These demographic 
variables control for the opportunity costs of engaging in pro-environment activities. For 
example, more educated individuals may be more sensitive to environmental issues or 
respondents with higher income may find it easier to incur costs associated with pro-environment 
actions such as buying more environmentally-friendly products.  Recycling could be more 
convenient for those who live in urban areas or who own their own homes.  Finally, we account 
for geographical factors that can influence the opportunity cost of engaging in the behaviors with 
indicator variables for region (Northeast, Midwest, South, and West).17  In Section 5.3, we 
discuss additional results when we include state-level variables, in particular, average retail 
prices of electricity, proportion of a state’s population with access to curbside programs, and 
average prices received by beef cattle farmers.  
Descriptive statistics and definitions for these variables appear in Table 1.  Compared to 
the U.S. Census Bureau demographic statistics, both our unweighted and weighted data are 
representative of the U.S. population.  The 2000 Census estimates that the U.S. population is 51 
percent female, 12 percent African-American, and 11 percent Hispanic, all within a 95 percent 
confidence interval for the means in our data.  Nonetheless, we use weighted data for Table 1 
and all models.18  
                                                     
17 We have also estimated the models considering nine, rather than four, geographical regions. The results for the 
variables of interest are very similar and we present the results of the more parsimonious model.  
18 Demographic and geographic distributions from the Current Population Survey as well as information from the 
entire Knowledge Networks panel re Internet access are used as benchmarks in the construction of the weights.  See 
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“Nearly all the time” is the modal response for RECYCLE at approximately 45 percent of 
the sample.  “Frequently” is the modal response for ENERGY and PRODUCT (39 and 38 
percent, respectively) while “Occasionally” is the most frequent response for FOOD (39 percent 
of the sample).  There are 173 unique response patterns to these questions and the frequency of 
patterns is very evenly distributed.  Overall, there is a substantial amount of variability in the 
frequency with which individuals engage in these four behaviors.  Regarding how people 
perceive the effectiveness of several activities, we find that most people do not have an accurate 
sense of the impact of their actions.  The source of error is that, on average, respondents 
overstate the effectiveness of some activities.  This can explain why fatalists do slightly better on 
the total score for this four question “quiz.”  It is interesting to compare other statistics between 
those who believe that they cannot do much about the environment (fatalists) and those who 
think they can.  As Table 1 shows, non-fatalists are more likely to engage in all types of 
behavior, to describe themselves as environmentalists, and rate the individual activities 
(recycling, using cold water, using compact fluorescent light bulbs, becoming a vegan) as having 
a high impact.  On the other hand, fatalists and non-fatalists seem to be equally civic-minded as 
indicated by the averages for the index of civic behavior, CIVIC.  If this variable is related to an 
individuals ability to receive a pure warm glow (a benefit from effort, regardless of the impact), 
this similarity could explain why the fatalists still contribute.   
Prior to presenting our results, we relate the variables discussed above to important 
concepts in the first order conditions of the optimization problem that appear in Equation 8.  
Specifically, we control for the perceived effect of various activities on reducing individual 
carbon emissions, ijij eg ∂∂ ˆ , with the specific belief questions: RECYCLE_BELIEF, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.hamilton.edu/levitt/Sustainability/Environmental_survey_2008.html  for more detail on the calculation 
of the weights.  Our main conclusions are unaffected by the use of sampling weights.   Results for estimations 
without weights and any others discussed but not reported in detail are available from the authors upon request.   
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COLD_BELIEF, LIGHT_BELIEF, and VEGAN_BELIEF.  Recall that our model predicts that 
the larger the impact an individual attributes to an activity, the more likely it is that the individual 
undertakes that activity more often.  This implies positive coefficient estimates for these 
variables.  After controlling for belief about the impact of specific activities on carbon 
abatement, we measure the perceived marginal effect of carbon abatement on the public good, 
iji gG ˆˆ ∂∂ , with FATALIST.  Holding everything else constant, we expect the coefficient on 
FATALIST to be negative, lower values of iji gG ˆˆ ∂∂ should be associated with less effort in 
providing the public good and greater consumption of the private good.  We proxy for the 
marginal effect of contribution on utility, iji gU ˆ∂∂ , with GREEN_SOME (“somewhat of an 
environmentalist”) and GREEN_DEF (“definitely an environmentalist”).  We hypothesize that 
the coefficients on these two variables are positive as environmentalists should derive more 
utility from contributing to the public good of resource conservation.  In addition, CIVIC might 
measure overall incentives to contribute to public goods.  We control for the marginal effect of 
the public good on utility, ii GU ˆ∂∂ , with PERSONAL and LIVSTAND.  We expect the 
coefficient on these variables to be positive as utility should increase with private benefits.  The 
model indicates that an individual’s optimal provision of the public good depends on the 
interaction of fatalism, warm glow, and perceived effectiveness.  Because we use binary 
variables to measure all these effects and the models are fairly complex, rather than adding 
interaction terms we estimate models for strong and weak environmentalists as well as fatalists 
and non-fatalists separately.   
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5  Results 
 In this section we first present the results of base specifications, discuss how perceived 
effectiveness of specific activities influences efforts, and then check for the robustness of our 
results.  
5.1  Base Models 
 Table 2 presents coefficients from an ordered probit estimation when we include all 
variables except the perceived effectiveness of specific activities in reducing carbon emissions.  
Some demographic controls consistently explain the frequency of pro-environment behaviors. 
Women are more likely to say that they conserve energy, buy environmentally friendly products, 
and alter their food consumption out of concern for the environment than men are.  We calculate 
that women are 6 percent more likely to say they conserve energy at home almost all the time 
than men are.  African-Americans are 14 percent less likely to recycle and 10 percent less likely 
to conserve energy at home at least frequently than individuals of any other race or ethnicity, 
everything else equal.  Those who live in more urban areas are more likely to recycle (perhaps 
because recycling programs are more widely available to urban residents) but they are less likely 
to report conserving energy or buying environmentally friendly products.  
The more strongly individuals agree with the statement that environmental degradation 
will cause living standards to decline, the more likely it is that they conserve energy at home 
(about 5 percent more likely to do this activity nearly all the time) and alter food consumption 
(about 7 percent more likely to do this activity at least frequently).19  Individuals who strongly 
agree with the statement that climate change may affect them personally are more likely to buy 
environmentally friendly products and alter food consumption (the coefficient in the energy 
model is significant at the 10 percent level).  The marginal effects are approximately of the same 
                                                     
19 We obtain qualitatively similar results when we enter three indicator variables for PERSONAL and LIVSTAND.  
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magnitude as the effects for LIVSTAND.  We also find the expected sign for CIVIC, suggesting 
that those who are more civic-minded are more likely to engage in all of these behaviors, 
independent of their values and beliefs about the environment.20     
As expected, self-proclaimed environmentalists are more likely to engage in all 
behaviors.  The more definite individuals are about their environmentalism, the larger the effect 
is.  Strong environmentalists are almost 29 percent more likely to conserve energy at home 
nearly all the time than non-environmentalists, 42 percent more likely to recycle nearly all the 
time than non-environmentalists, 36 percent more likely to purchase environment-friendly 
products, and 26 percent more likely to alter their food consumption.  The marginal effects for 
the weak environmentalists (relative to non-environmentalists) are approximately half of the 
effects for the strong environmentalists.  Meanwhile, individuals who do not believe that they 
can have an impact on the environment are less likely to engage in all behaviors.  Everything else 
equal, fatalists are about 10 percent less likely to recycle and buy environment-friendly products 
nearly all the time than non-fatalists.  Fatalists are approximately 8 percent less likely to 
conserve energy and alter food consumption as often as non-fatalists. 21 
Knowledge that using coal, oil, or gas contributes to climate change affects recycling 
behavior and energy conservation only.  It might be that it is more difficult for individuals to 
relate the use of environmentally friendly products or food consumption to carbon emissions 
than it is to understand the relationship between recycling or energy conservation and carbon 
emissions.  Finally, these models include SCORE, the score that individuals received on the four 
question quiz about the impact of specific behaviors on carbon abatement.  We find that better 
                                                     
20 This result corroborates the findings of Owen and Videras (2006) who find a similar effect using data from the 
World Values Survey. 
21 A number of studies in economics and other fields show fatalism to be a strong predictor of behavior such as 
disaster preparedness (McClure, Allen and Walkey, 2001), voting behavior (Goodwin and Allen, 2000), and saving 
(Wu, 2005). 
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knowledge about the effect of specific behaviors is negatively and significantly related to energy 
conservation at the 5 percent level and buying environmentally friendly products at the 10 
percent.  Since individuals tend to overestimate the effectiveness of specific activities, this result 
is consistent with a modified warm glow: a higher score implies the individual is less likely to 
overestimate the impact of the activities and therefore is less likely to engage in these behaviors, 
all else constant.    
In the models in Table 2, the estimates of the cut-off points are all statistically different 
from zero.  We also have evidence to reject the null hypothesis that the difference between 
consecutive thresholds is zero.  Thus, the responses (“Almost all the time,” “Frequently,” 
Occasionally,” and “Never”) reflect distinct meaningful thresholds approximating the intensity 
of the behavior.  This suggests it is not appropriate to collapse responses into a binary indicator.  
Although many surveys such as the World Values Survey use dichotomous choice questions, we 
find interesting results regarding both the type of behavior and the intensity of the behavior.22   
5.2 The Effects of Perceived Effectiveness of Specific Activities 
 In Table 3 we drop the variable SCORE and add the perceived impacts of specific 
behaviors individually.  We remind the reader that we gave the baseline example that adjusting 
the thermostat up or down two degrees reduces carbon emissions by approximately 2,000 pounds 
per year and then asked people to provide their best guess for the annual reduction in carbon 
emissions (less than 1,500 pounds, 1,500 to 2,500 pounds, or more than 2,500 pounds) for each 
activity: recycling half of the household’s waste (RECYCLE_BELIEF), replacing five regular 
light bulbs with five compact fluorescent light bulbs (LIGHT_BELIEF), eliminating all other 
animal products from diet (VEGAN_BELIEF), and using cold water instead of warm or hot 
                                                     
22 We also estimate a multinomial logit model and perform a likelihood-ratio test that strongly rejects the null 
hypothesis that any pair of categories can be collapsed.  
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water to wash clothes (COLD_BELIEF).  Thus, we interpret the coefficients as the effect of 
believing a given activity reduces carbon emissions by 1,500 to 2,500 pounds or more than 2,500 
pounds relative to the omitted category (the activity reduces carbon emissions by less than 1,500 
pounds per year).23  
In the first column of Table 3 we include indicator variables for individuals who believe 
that recycling has a medium impact on reducing carbon emissions and a indicator variable for 
those who think the impact is high (the correct answer is medium impact).  The positive and 
significant coefficient on the high impact belief (RECYCLE_BELIEF_HI) indicates that people 
who believe that recycling half of one’s household garbage reduces carbon emissions by more 
than 2,500 pound of carbon emissions per year are more likely to recycle more often.  Columns 
two through four present similar findings for ENERGY, PRODUCT, and FOOD.  Those who 
believe that a specific activity has a higher impact than the baseline are more likely to engage in 
the behavior most closely related to that activity with greater frequency.  Because it might be 
possible that people who believe that all activities are high impact are more likely to engage in 
each behavior, we include indicator variables for the perceived effectiveness of all activities 
simultaneously in each model (columns 5 through 8 of Table 3).  We find that it is the perceived 
effect of the activity most closely associated with each behavior that enters significantly and not 
the perceived effects of any of the other three activities. 
Table 4 presents the marginal effects from the coefficient estimates in Table 3, columns 1 
through 4.  For example, the second column of Table 4 shows the marginal effect of believing 
                                                     
23 When answering these questions, individuals might have focused on the relative comparison with energy 
conservation since the baseline uses adjusting the thermostat as an example. If this were the case, we should not find 
that a perceived high impact of using cold water correlates with overall energy conservation. However, we do find 
positive and strongly significant effects of this belief on energy conservation. In addition, we do not find that 
perceived high impacts of other activities have a negative and significant effect on energy conservation. These 
results suggest that individuals evaluate the effectiveness of the activities relative to the baseline of 2,000 pounds per 
year and not relative to the activity of energy conservation as a whole.     
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that recycling half of a household’s garbage reduces carbon emissions by more than 2,500 
pounds per year.  This perception reduces the probability that people never recycle by 2.5 
percent, the probability that people “occasionally” recycle by 4.7 percent, and the probability that 
people “frequently” recycle by about 1 percent (conversely, it increases the probability that 
people report recycling “nearly all the time” by 8.1 percent).  Similar findings are evident with 
the remaining beliefs and behaviors.  The stronger the perceived effectiveness of a specific 
activity is, the higher the probabilities of engaging in the four pro-environment behaviors with 
greater frequencies.   
 To strengthen our confidence in these results we perform additional analyses on the 
responses to the questions about perceived impacts.  First, it is possible that there is collinearity 
between the perceived impacts of various activities.  In that case, it might be hard to determine 
whether beliefs about specific activities are correlated with behaviors.  To examine this issue we 
estimate models that include each individual knowledge question separately for each of the 
behaviors.  We find very little significance for the “cross-effects”.  For example, the only 
specific knowledge question that is statistically significant in the recycling behavior regression is 
the one related to the impact of recycling.24  Overall, these results provide evidence that it is the 
individual’s belief about the impact of specific activities, correct or incorrect, that drives that 
particular behavior.   
Second, we note that the questions about the perceived effectiveness of different 
activities can be difficult to answer.  In that case, people may choose a “neutral” answer.  We 
examined the response patterns to those four questions and found that the most common pattern, 
                                                     
24 There are a few exceptions: people who believe recycling has a large impact on reducing carbon emissions are 
also more likely to report buying environmentally friendly products and altering food consumption, and people who 
believe that using cold water instead of hot has a large impact are also more likely to report altering food 
consumption. 
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about 10 percent of the sample, is to say each activity has medium impact.  This is a potential 
focal point.  To asses if this affects our results, we created an indicator variable that equals 1 if 
the respondent chooses the most common pattern.  This variable does not significantly predict 
any of the four dependent variables and the estimates of the perceived effect questions and other 
controls are almost identical.  
Third, it might be possible that the perceived effectiveness of different activities does not 
influence people’s efforts and that, when asked to guess how effective a given activity is, 
individuals assign greater effectiveness to the activities they engage in more often.  In that event, 
the responses to the impact questions would simply be another measure of efforts.  To determine 
if this is a cause for concern, we examine whether the responses to the questions about the 
effectiveness of specific activities are systematically related to the responses to other questions in 
the survey, responses that we would not expect to be a consequence of a person’s pro-
environment behaviors.  In particular, we estimate how people answer questions about the 
likelihood that climate change will affect them personally and their opinion on whether we worry 
too much about environmental problems and not enough about prices and jobs.  We estimate 
models that include both perceived impacts and the frequency of pro-environment behaviors.25  
We find that the higher the impact on carbon emissions that individuals assign to a given activity 
the more likely it is that individuals believe climate change will affect them and the more likely 
it is that they disagree that we worry too much about the environment.  For example, after 
controlling for actual recycling efforts, we find that individuals who incorrectly believe recycling 
half of a household’s waste reduces carbon emissions by more than 2,500 pounds are more likely 
to strongly disagree we worry too much about the environment (coefficient significant at the 1 
                                                     
25 We estimate ordered probit models that also include income, education, gender, race, age, region, and whether the 
respondents consider themselves environmentalists.    
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percent level).  Similarly, after controlling for efforts to purchase environment-friendly products, 
individuals who believe using compact fluorescent light bulbs has a high impact are more likely 
to believe climate change will impact them personally (also significant at the 1 percent level).  
Because these estimations also include the actual pro-environment behaviors, these results 
suggest that the beliefs about impacts have additional explanatory power and that people’s 
responses to the questions about perceived effectiveness are not simply another measure of 
behavior.  Rather, these responses seem consistent with a person’s overall view of the severity 
and importance of environmental problems.  
Comparing fatalists and non-fatalists might also shed light on whether perceived 
effectiveness influences pro-environment behaviors or if it is the case that people who do certain 
behavior simply assign a greater effectiveness to that behavior.  Fatalists think their individual 
contributions do not help to improve environmental quality.  Thus, their beliefs about the effects 
of several activities on carbon emissions should not be a significant factor in their decision to 
contribute (we would expect that altruism and environmental attitudes could affect their efforts).  
On the other hand, if beliefs about impacts merely reflect efforts, then we should still observe the 
same correlations between perceived impacts and efforts for this group of individuals as well.  
Table 5 presents the results when we split our sample into fatalists and non-fatalists.  As 
expected, beliefs about the effectiveness of different activities do not correlate with the 
frequency of pro-environment behaviors among fatalists, with six of the eight coefficients in the 
fatalists regressions entering insignificantly.   The exceptions are the belief that using cold water 
has a high impact and, marginally at the 10 percent level, the belief that using compact 
fluorescent light bulbs has medium impact.  In contrast, all eight coefficients for the non-fatalists 
enter significantly with the expected signs.  The fact that the positive correlation between 
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perceived impacts and efforts does not generally hold for fatalists suggests that it is not the case 
that individuals simply give a higher impact to the behaviors they undertake more often.       
What then are the factors that explain efforts by fatalists?  We find that a person’s level 
of civic-mindedness correlates with ENERGY and PRODUCT (marginally with FOOD) among 
fatalists.  In addition, self-proclaimed environmentalists who are also fatalists are still more 
likely to engage in pro-environment behaviors with greater frequency than those individuals who 
do not consider themselves environmentalists.26  In fact, the marginal effect of being at least a 
weak environmentalist appears to be stronger for fatalists than for non-fatalists.  These results 
suggest that it is the combination of being a fatalist and not an environmentalist that has large 
negative effects on the provision of the public good.          
5.3 Robustness Checks 
While our discussion has focused on the results of ordered probit models, we also 
estimate ordered logit models and find similar conclusions.  A limitation of ordered models is the 
assumption of parallel regression.27  When we estimate multinomial probit models that relax the 
assumption of parallel regression we find that we can draw the same inferences about the 
hypotheses of interest.  We also estimate OLS models treating the behaviors as numerical 
variables and find that the models explain between 23 and 26 percent of the variability in the 
dependent variables.  Given that we use individual level data, the goodness-of-fit of the models 
is quite good.  Qualitatively and in terms of statistical significance the results are almost 
identical.  Overall, the main results are very robust to different estimation methods. 
                                                     
26 This result is consistent with findings by Kahn (2007). 
27 We perform a Brant test after running the ordered logit models and find violations of the assumption for a few 
variables in each model.  Importantly, for the perceived impact questions, we only reject the assumption of parallel 
regression for LIGHTKNOW3 in the PRODUCT model (at the 5 percent level). 
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Finally, we note that our model assumes individuals engage in pro-environment behavior 
in order to receive a warm glow and the survey questions prompt respondents to report behaviors 
that are done “out of concern for the environment.”  Even so, it is possible that individuals may 
be accurately reporting behavior, but still engaging in some of these behaviors to reduce 
household expenses, rather than to receive the warm glow.  To validate that our results are robust 
to the inclusion of variables related to individual costs, we exploit variability across states in the 
opportunity cost of engaging in the behaviors.  First, we use a finer regional categorization and 
estimate the models with eight dummy variables for New England, Mid-Atlantic states, East-
North Central states, South-Atlantic, East-South Central, West-South Central, and Mountain 
states.  Second, we use three state-level variables that may be related to individual costs and 
benefits: the proportion of individuals in the state with access to curbside recycling programs in 
the empirical model estimating frequency of recycling, retail residential electricity prices (2006 
averages) in the empirical models for ENERGY and PRODUCT, and average prices farmers 
receive for beef cattle at the state level as a possible control in the model predicting FOOD.28  
The coefficient on access to curbside recycling programs is positive and significant at the 5 
percent level.  The dummy variables for the perceived impact of recycling are still positive and 
the dummy for high impact is now statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  The 
coefficient estimates on retail prices and price received for cattle are insignificant.  Importantly, 
the indicators for perceived effectiveness maintain their levels of statistical significance, 
providing support for the claim that costs and benefits that accrue to the individual are not the 
sole reason for engaging in the behaviors. 
                                                     
28 For access to curbside programs, we use 2000 data from the 12th annual Biocycle nationwide survey (Biocycle 
magazine, April 2000). We obtain 2006 average residential retail electricity prices from the Energy Information 
Administration (http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/table5_6_a.html).  The prices received of beef cattle 
come from the USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service.  The results are available from the authors upon 
request. 
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6 Summary and Conclusions 
 This paper contributes to the research on the voluntary provision of public goods by 
examining how the perceived effectiveness of contributions influences actual contributions.  We 
develop a model in which warm glow depends on the impact of efforts and individuals hold 
different beliefs about the effectiveness of their efforts.  We use a new national survey to test the 
implications of the model.  A unique aspect of our work is that we can test how beliefs about the 
extent to which different activities reduce carbon emissions correlates with the frequency of pro-
environmental behaviors.  
Our empirical results show that individuals’ actions are consistent with their beliefs, 
regardless of whether or not these beliefs are accurate.  Individuals who believe that a given 
activity significantly reduces carbon emissions are more likely to engage in behaviors related to 
that activity than to other activities that they believe have less impact.  In addition, it is the 
perceived effect of the activity most closely associated with each behavior that matters and not 
the perceived effects of other activities.  Importantly, we find evidence that individuals are not 
simply assessing a higher impact to the behaviors they undertake more often.  Rather, the 
responses to the questions regarding the impact of specific activities on carbon emissions are 
consistent with the respondents’ overall view of the severity and importance of environmental 
problems.  Although in our theoretical model the correlation between perceived effectiveness of 
an activity and effort is theoretically ambiguous, these results suggest that the substitution effect 
dominates the output effect. 
These findings imply that the voluntary provision of the public good might increase or 
decrease as individuals learn about the actual impact of their activities.  The typical respondent in 
our sample has a poor understanding about the amount of carbon dioxide emissions that can be 
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prevented with different activities.  In particular, respondents generally overestimate the impact 
of their efforts. Because higher perceived impacts correlate with higher frequency of pro-
environment behavior, it might then be possible that better informed consumers would choose to 
provide less effort in creating the public good than poorly informed individuals.  Conversely, to 
the extent that the typical individual underestimates the effectiveness of some activities that have 
large impacts, education might cause a more efficient allocation of efforts.  Individuals in our 
sample overestimate the impact of using cold water instead of hot water and the impact of using 
fluorescent light bulbs. On the other hand, around 80 percent of the respondents underestimate 
the effect of the high impact behavior of eliminating meat and all other animal products from 
one’s diet. 
Although we cannot rule out the possibility of some reverse causality in our results—that 
behaviors cause beliefs—even this phenomenon would be consistent with a utility function that 
valued the perceived impact of efforts.  As long as it is the case that individuals gain utility from 
perceived impact, our policy conclusion remains intact.  More accurate information may change 
behavior by either increasing or decreasing pro-environment efforts.  However, to the extent that 
individuals do not respond to new information and exclusively form their beliefs based on their 
behavior, our policy conclusion about the effects of accurate information would be tempered. 
Finally, as is the case with Andreoni’s (1989) warm glow model, our model also implies 
that government intervention does not completely crowd out individual efforts.  Andreoni shows 
that the warm glow motive implies crowding out of charitable donations is incomplete.  Because 
individuals care about giving per se, a tax that pays for increases in the public good does not 
completely substitute for private giving.  In the context of pro-environment behaviors, it is 
appropriate to consider government mandated behavior such as fuel efficiency standards, 
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mandated recycling, required phasing out of incandescent light bulbs, etc.  In our model, 
government mandates would not be perfect substitutes for voluntary pro-environment actions, 
independent of whether individuals are fully informed.   
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Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
 Definition Overall 
Mean 
Mean 
“fatalis
ts” 
Mean 
“non-
fatalists” 
RECYCLE Frequency of recycling (1-4 scale) 2.96 2.70 3.09*** 
ENERGY Frequency of energy conservation (1-4) 2.96 2.75 3.06*** 
PRODUCT Frequency of using env.-friendly 
products (1-4)  
2.77 2.51 2.90*** 
FOOD Frequency of altering food cons. (1-4) 2.35 2.17 2.43*** 
GREEN_SOME “Somewhat” of an environmentalist .485 .423 .516*** 
GREEN_DEF “Definitely” an environmentalist .075 .034 .095*** 
FATALIST Difficult to do much about environment .330 1 0 
COAL_DEF Using coal, oil or gas definitely 
contributes to climate change 
.240 .200 .260** 
COAL_PROB Using coal, oil or gas probably 
contributes to climate change 
.535 .535 .534 
COAL_NOT Using coal, oil or gas probably doesn’t 
cont. to climate change 
.180 .201 .170 
VEGAN_BELIEF_MED =1 if medium impact of vegan .328 .366 .309** 
VEGAN_BELIEF_HI+ =1 if high impact of vegan .171 .154 .178 
RECYCLE_BELIEF_MED+ =1 if medium impact for recycle .442 .504 .412** 
RECYCLE_BELIEF_HI =1 if high impact for recycle .329 .219 .383*** 
COLD_BELIEF_MED =1 if medium impact for using cold 
water instead of hot 
.494 .487 .497 
COLD_BELIEF_HI =1 if high impact for using cold water 
instead of hot 
.264 .225 .283** 
LIGHT_BELIEF_MED =1 if medium impact of using 
fluorescent light bulbs 
.536 .525 .542 
LIGHT_BELIEF_HI =1 if high impact of using fluorescent 
light bulbs 
.151 .115 .168** 
SCORE Overall score on impact rankings 1.15 1.27 1.09*** 
PERSONAL Belief that climate change will affect 
individual personally 
2.80 2.61 2.88 
OPTIMIST Economy will improve, 1 to 4 scale 2.40 2.40 2.40 
LIVSTAND Belief that living standards will decline 3.02 2.98 3.04 
CIVIC Index of civic behavior 34.31 33.87 34.53 
Married =1 if married .561 .549 .566 
Homeowner =1 if own home .651 .617 .667 
Ln(Income) Ln(household income) 10.48 10.34 10.55*** 
High School =1 if high school graduate .576 .594 .567 
College =1 if college graduate .283 .188 .329*** 
Health Self-reported health status (1-4) 3.37 3.20 3.45*** 
Female =1 if female .521 .469 .546** 
Black =1 if African American .112 .105 .116 
Hispanic =1 if Hispanic .127 .124 .128 
Age Age of respondent 46.31 48.00 45.47 
Urban Percent urban in zip code 77.70 77.06 78.01 
Statistics calculated using sampling weights.+ indicates correct answer, Asterisks indicate that the 
differences in means significant at the 1% (***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) level. 
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Table 2:  Ordered Probit Models, Base Estimations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RECYCLE ENERGY PRODUCT FOOD 
Married .144* (.085) -.037 (.076) -.004 (.076) .003 (.079) 
Homeowner .281*** (.090) .144* (.085) .065 (.087) -.009 (.092) 
Ln(Income) .053 (.045) -.047 (.045) -.043 (.045) -.006 (.048) 
High School -.013 (.107) .031 (.105) .041 (.114) .011 (.114) 
College .204 (.126) .077 (.117) -.015 (.130) -.115 (.130) 
Health .094** (.038) .046 (.036) .088** (.040) .048 (.040) 
Female .105 (.071) .173** (.069) .139** (.069) .201*** (.072) 
Black -.367*** (.117) -.311*** (.110) -.058 (.120) .007 (.116) 
Hispanic -.117 (.110) -.008 (.122) .127 (.129) .125 (.119) 
Age -.022* (.012) .018 (.011) .016 (.011) .017 (.012) 
Age*Age .000** (.000) -.000 (.000) -.000 (.000) -.000 (.000) 
Urban .005*** (.001) -.002* (.001) -.002** (.001) -.001 (.001) 
OPTIMIST .054 (.047) .028 (.044) .088* (.047) .052 (.047) 
PERSONAL -.022 (.050) .080* (.047) .157*** (.052) .157*** (.054) 
COAL_DEF .784*** (.219) .808*** (.225) .309 (.204) .268 (.215) 
COAL_PROB .542*** (.186) .598*** (.203) .104 (.179) .099 (.174) 
COAL_NOT .463** (.185) .650*** (.198) .141 (.181) .166 (.169) 
LIVSTAND .090 (.059) .128*** (.049) .064 (.050) .161*** (.055) 
CIVIC .017*** (.006) .032*** (.005) .022*** (.005) .011** (.006) 
FATALIST -.259*** (.072) -.237*** (.074) -.355*** (.076) -.214*** (.080) 
GREEN_SOME .495*** (.075) .385*** (.073) .495*** (.076) .487*** (.081) 
GREEN_DEF 1.150*** (.178) .753*** (.144) 1.011*** (.137) .983*** (.147) 
SCORE -.030 (.038) -.092** (.042) -.070* (.040) .016 (.040) 
Cut-off 1 1.23*** (.61) .88*** (.57) .47*** (.59) 1.81*** (.61) 
Cut-off 2 2.25*** (.61) 2.13*** (.56) 1.93*** (.59) 3.09*** (.61) 
Cut-off 3 2.99*** (.61) 3.28*** (.56) 3.09*** (.60) 4.12*** (.61) 
Observations 1671 1670 1671 1671 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
All estimations use survey weights and include regional indicator variables
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Table 3:  Ordered Probit Models: The Effects of Beliefs about Specific Impacts  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 RECYCLE ENERGY PRODUCT FOOD RECYCLE ENERGY PRODUCT FOOD 
RECYCLE_BELIEF_MED .1444    .1432 .0108 .1268 .1597* 
 (.0902)    (.0923) (.0882) (.0980) (.0905) 
RECYCLE_BELIEF_HI .2082**    .2448** .0250 .1127 .1462 
 (.0996)    (.1040) (.0959) (.1043) (.0978) 
COLD_BELIEF_MED  .1848**   .0879 .1761** -.0099 -.0618 
  (.0852)   (.0851) (.0860) (.0895) (.0877) 
COLD_BELIEF_HI  .4038***   .0204 .4007*** .1332 .0478 
  (.0958)   (.1049) (.0981) (.1016) (.1029) 
LIGHT_BELIEF_MED   .1937***  -.0813 .0462 .1527** .0031 
   (.0746)  (.0812) (.0765) (.0769) (.0753) 
LIGHT_BELIEF_HI   .2269**  -.0638 .0441 .1760 .0436 
   (.1150)  (.1094) (.1197) (.1223) (.1247) 
VEGAN_BELIEF_MED    .2054*** .0195 -.0148 .0884 .1877** 
    (.0768) (.0788) (.0779) (.0789) (.0788) 
VEGAN_BELIEF_HI    .2368** -.1377 -.0756 -.1150 .2056** 
    (.1024) (.1094) (.1007) (.0976) (.1019) 
Observations 1671 1670 1671 1671 1671 1670 1671 1671 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  Includes all control variables used in 
estimations in Tables 2 except SCORE.  Uses sampling weights.       
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Table 4:  Marginal Effects from Ordered Probit Models (Based on estimations in Table 3) 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 RECYCLE RECYCLE ENERGY ENERGY 
Impact Belief RECYCLE_BELIEF_ME
D 
RECYCLE_BELIEF_H
I  
COLD_BELIEF_MED  COLD_BELIEF_HI 
Prob (Never) -.018 
(.011) 
-.025** 
(.011) 
-.013** 
(.006) 
-.024*** 
(.006) 
Prob (Ocasionally) -.033*       
(.020) 
-.047 ** 
(.022) 
-.048** 
(.022) 
-.10*** 
(.024) 
Prob (Frequently) -.005 
(.004) 
-.009* 
(.006) 
-.001 
(.003) 
-.017** 
(.009) 
Prob (Nearly All the Time) .056  
(.035) 
.081** 
(.039) 
.063** 
(.029) 
.144*** 
(.035) 
   
 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 PRODUCT PRODUCT FOOD FOOD 
Impact Belief PRODUCT_BELIEF_MED PRODUCT_BELIEF_HI VEGAN_BELIEF_MED VEGAN_BELIEF_HI 
Prob (Never) -.016** 
(.007) 
-.016** 
(.007) 
-048*** 
(.017) 
-.053** 
(.021) 
Prob (Ocasionally) -.057*** 
(.022) 
-.068** 
(.034) 
-.032** 
(.013) 
-.040** 
(.020) 
Prob (Frequently) .021** 
(.009) 
.017*** 
(.006) 
.043*** 
(.016) 
.049** 
(.020) 
Prob (Nearly All the Time) .053*** 
(.020) 
.067** 
(.036) 
.036** 
(.014) 
.044** 
(.021) 
Standard errors in parentheses *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%        
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Table 5:  Ordered Probit Models for Split Sample (Fatalists versus Non-Fatalists) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 RECYCL
E 
RECYCLE ENERGY ENERGY PRODUCT PRODUCT FOOD  FOOD 
 Fatalists Non-Fatalists Fatalists Non-Fatalists Fatalists Non-Fatalists Fatalists Non-Fatalists 
CIVIC .011 .022*** .043*** .024*** .037*** .013* .015* .012* 
 (.009) (.007) (.008) (.007) (.008) (.007) (.008) (.007) 
GREEN_SOME .556*** .481*** .551*** .292*** .564*** .466*** .580*** .435*** 
 (.129) (.094) (.129) (.090) (.133) (.092) (.135) (.096) 
GREEN_DEF 1.380*** 1.192*** .841*** .771*** 1.186*** 1.006*** 1.105*** .956*** 
 (.413) (.196) (.310) (.161) (.273) (.158) (.371) (.155) 
RECYCLE_ 
BELIEF_MED 
-.021 
(.140) 
.261** 
(.113) 
      
RECYCLE_ 
BELIEF_HI 
.000 
(.171) 
.337*** 
(.122) 
      
COLD_ 
BELIEF_MED 
  .017 
(.133) 
.298*** 
(.113) 
    
COLD_ 
BELIEF_HI 
  .385** 
(.158) 
.452*** 
(.124) 
    
LIGHT_ 
BELIEF_MED 
    .235* 
(.124) 
.169* 
(.094) 
  
LIGHT_ 
BELIEF_HI 
    .016 
(.182) 
.338** 
(.141) 
  
VEGAN_ 
BELIEF_MED 
      -.069 
(.133) 
.300*** 
(.094) 
VEGAN_ 
BELIEF_HI 
      .191 
(.188) 
.252** 
(.117) 
Observations 513 1158 513 1157 514 1157 514 1157 
Robust Standard errors in parentheses; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Includes all control variables used in 
estimations in Tables 2 except SCORE and FATALIST; uses sampling weights. 
 
